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Auctions are increasingly used in agri-environmental contracting. However, the issue of synergy effect 
between agri-environmental measures has been consistently overlooked, both by decision-makers and 
by the theoretical literature on conservation auction.  
Based  on  laboratory  experiments,  the  objective  of  this  paper  is  to  compare  the  performance  of 
different  procurement  auction  designs  (simultaneous,  sequential  and  combinatorial)  in  the  case  of 
multiple heterogeneous units where bidders may potentially want to sell more than one unit and where 
their  supply  cost  structure  displays  positive  synergies.  The  comparison  is  made  by  using  two 
performance criteria: budget efficiency and allocative efficiency.  We also test if performance results  
are  affected  by  information  feedback  to  bidders    after  each  auction  period.  Finally  we  explain 
performance results by the analysis of bidding behaviour in the three mechanisms. 
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Les  enchères  sont  de  plus  en  plus  utilisées  pour  l’allocation  des  contrats  agri-environnementaux. 
Cependant, les problèmes liés aux effets de synergie entre les mesures agri-environnementales sont 
constamment  négligés  par  le  décideur  public  et  par  la  littérature  théorique  des  enchères  de 
conservation. 
Basé sur des expériences en laboratoire, l’objectif de ce papier est de comparer la performance de 
différents mécanismes d’enchères inverses (simultanée, séquentielle et combinatoire) pour l’allocation 
de plusieurs unités hétérogènes, dans lesquels les enchérisseurs peuvent  mettre potentiellement en 
vente plus d’une unité et possèdent des fonctions d’offre dont la structure des coûts présente une 
synergie  positive.  La  comparaison  est  réalisée  par  l’utilisation  de  deux  critères  de  performance : 
l’efficience budgétaire et l’efficience d’allocation. Nous testons si un retour d’information fournit aux 
enchérisseurs affecte les résultats de performance après chaque période. Finalement, nous expliquons 
les résultats de performance par l’analyse des stratégies de mise dans les trois mécanismes. 
 
JEL Classification: Q5 ; C91 ; D61 






                                                 
1 PhD student – Inra-Lameta 2 place Viala 34060 Montpellier cedex 1 (France) –e-mail: said@supagro.inra.fr 
2 Professor, Département Sciences sociales, économie, gestion, SupAgro-Lameta, 2 place Viala 34060 
Montpellier cedex 1 (France) e-mail: thoyer@supagro.inra.fr 
   2 
Introduction 
 
Over the last few decades in Europe, agricultural intensification accelerated the decline in soil 
and water quality as well as biodiversity loss. The social demand for a better environment and 
for better management of natural and landscape resources has led European policy-makers to 
increase Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) budgets dedicated to incentive payments for 
farmers willing to adopt more environmentally-friendly practices on their private land. The 
EU Rural Development Regulation grants member states a large measure of subsidiarity for 
designing  their  own  agri-environmental  schemes,  matching  them  to  local  conditions  and  
regional environmental priorities. This discretion has resulted in a wide variety of measures 
within a large range of objectives and management prescriptions. 
 
The French agri-environmental scheme is based on a menu of more than one hundred eligible 
environmental measures (such as mowing pastures later in the season, using less pesticide, 
planting and maintaining hedgerows, or leaving uncultivated margins around fields to provide 
animal habitats), restricted to a shorter list for each region. From this list, farmers can design 
their  own  combination  of  environmental  actions,  best  suited  to  their  cost  structure  and 
preferences. A 5-year contract is signed between the  farmer and the state, where the farmer 
commits himself to comply with the selected actions, in return for a yearly compensatory 
premium. This premium is the sum of pre-defined unit payments for each action. Payments 
for each action –or measure- are calculated by a regional commission (under the supervision 
national and European authorities) on the basis of estimated costs of compliance (in terms of 
revenue foregone or increased input costs) averaged at the regional level.  
 
It  is  well-known  that  such  an  allocation  procedure  does  not  overcome  information 
asymmetries between farmers and public authorities. Farmers tailor their agri-environmental 
contract  so  as  to  maximize  the  difference  between  the  contract  premium  and  their  true 
compliance costs, often at the expense of environmental gains. The resulting disappointing 
efficiency of agri-environmental schemes has been well documented in the mid-term review 
of agri-environmental schemes of the European Commission (CE, 2005): it is a costly policy 
which has relatively little environmental impact. Since agri-environmental policies were often 
used by member States to supplement farm income, they were only moderately preoccupied 
with the efficiency issue.  However, the mid-term review of the CAP in July 2003 has put 
greater emphasis on  environmental sustainability.  The European Commission  required that 
agri-environmental  schemes  include  quantifiable  objectives,  be  more  cost-effective,  and 
encourage member States to adopt  competitive bidding in the allocation process. There is 
therefore mounting pressure to evaluate the feasibility of an allocation scheme avoiding the 
pitfalls of posted-price contracting systems. 
 
In  the  US  and  in  Australia,  decision-makers  have  sought  to  overcome  information 
asymmetries by privileging competitive bidding procedures: by inducing competition between 
farmers, auctions reach outcomes which are generally Pareto-superior to a posted-price offer 
system. Auctions are frequently used in agri-environmental contracting (Latacz-Lohmann and 
Schilizzi, 2005).  The US Departement of Agriculture has been awarding land retirement 
contracts in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) on the basis of competitive bidding 
mechanism since 1986 (Babcock et al, 1996; Johansson and Cattaneo, 2006). The State of 
Victoria in Australia has trialed several auction-based approaches to allocate conservation 
contracts to private landholders, ie the BushTender program (Stoneham et al, 2003) and the 
EcoTender program (Eigenraam et al, 2006). The Australian Federal State has even launched 
an ambitious program to extend the auction system for agri-environmental programs. It is   3 
important to note that Europe takes increasing interest in these approaches: for example the 
Countryside  Stewardship  Scheme  (CSS)  which  is  the  main  agri-environmental  scheme  in 
United Kingdom is based on a competitive bidding system: for a given premium per hectare, 
farmers  bid  on  the  package  of  environmental  actions  they  are  willing  to  undertake,  in 
conformity with environmental priorities defined at the regional level (Dobbs et Pretty, 2001). 
Germany has also set up an experimental bidding process for biodiversity conservation on 
grassland (Groth, 2005). 
 
Agri-environmental auctions have thus given rise to a vast theoretical and empirical literature 
(see Latacz Lohmann and Schilizzi, 2005, for a review). Most of this literature focuses on the 
case when the farmer wants to sell only one indivisible contract to a government wanting to 
buy a series of identical agri-environmental contracts. However, in reality, public authorities 
auction off several types of agri-environmental measures and farmers are willing to sign for a 
combination  of  these  measures.  These  auctions  are  therefore  procurement  auctions  for 
heterogeneous  units  (each  unit  corresponding  to  one  specific  agri-environmental  measure 
AEM) in which bidders are potentially willing to sell more than one unit. What is particularly 
interesting to analyse – and often overlooked – is the synergy effect between AEM. When 
contracting, farmers tend to choose a combination of measures, which implemented together 
cost  less  than  if  they  were  implemented  separately  (positive  synergy  or  sub-additivity  of 
costs).  This  can  be  due  to  input  jointness  (set-up  costs  or  variable  costs  associated  with 
specific inputs or dedicated equipment), to economies of scope (including on intangible assets 
such as savoir-faire), or to complementary effects on production. On the other hand, they will 
tend to avoid measures which combined together cost more than separately (negative synergy 
or  superadditivity  of  costs),  although  it  could  have  led  to  more  desirable  environmental 
outcomes from the view point of society. Moreover, it is sometimes the case that farmers are 
presented with various contracts (Natura 2000 contracts, agri-environmental measures, local 
incentives) at different periods in time, preventing them from benefiting fully of the potential 
cost-saving impact of synergies between contracts.  
 
The objective of this paper is to compare the performance of different procurement auction 
designs in the case of multiple heterogeneous units where bidders may potentially want to sell 
more than one unit and where their supply cost structure displays positive synergies. Multi-
unit auctions which involve synergies between units generate different bidding strategies than 
the same auctions without synergies (Jeitschko and Wolfstetter, 2002; Grimm 2004; Cantillon 
and  Pesendorfer  2004).  However,  there  is  no  general  result  allowing  to  rank  auction 
mechanisms  according  to  their  performance  in  terms  of  efficiency  and  cost-saving.  The 
difficulty  to  identify  equilibria  in  bidding  strategies  in  presence  of  synergies  has  called 
attention  to  the  results  obtained  from  laboratory  experiments.  Our  experiment  is  partially 
based on the work of Lunander and Nilsson (2004) who have compared the bidding behaviour 
for multiple contracts in three different sealed-bid auctions mechanisms. Whereas the design 
of their experiment was based on  public procurement auctions of road marking in Sweden, 
we have tailored our experiment to take account of the specificities of agri-environmental 
contracting issues.  
 
We thus compare three auction designs: (i) an auction where farmers bid simultaneously on 
various agri-environmental measures without bundling. This is a simultaneous auction. (ii) an 
auction  where  farmers  bid  sequentially  on  measures.  Under  the  sequential  bidding 
mechanism,  bidders  are  thus  allowed  to  observe  the  outcome  of  bidding  on  the  measure   
before submitting bids to the second. It provides information about the outcome of one contest 
before competing for the next. This is called the sequential auction. (ii) an auction where   4 
farmers can bid on AEM separately as well as on packages of measures in order to indicate 
synergies. This is a combinatorial auction. The payment rule for the three designs is a sealed-
bid  pay-as-bid  (also  called  first  price  auction  in  the  literature)  format,  since  all  auctions 
conducted for agri-environmental purposes have used this format. Our experiment also allows 
us to analyse the impact of repetition and information on auction performance. It is likely that 
auctions to allocate environmental contracts will have to be organized at least on a yearly 
basis  (like  in  the  Conservation  Reserve  Program)  in  order  to  allow  previously  non 
participating  farmers  to  enter  the  scheme  at  a  later  date.  Repeated  auctions  will  provide 
feedback information to bidders on accepted bids and may reduce the competitive pressure. 
One question concerns therefore the information that should be fed back to bidders after each 
round of auction (Cason and Gangadharan, 2004).  
 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  in  the  first  section,  we  describe  synergies  in  agri-
evironmental measures and the resulting allocation issue. Section 2 is a literature review of 
theoretical and empirical findings on the performance of multi-unit auction of hetergogeneous 
units  with  synergies.  Section  3  presents  our  experimental  set-up  and  results.  Section  4 
concludes.   
 
1.  Agri-environmental contracting and synergies  
 
By  providing  financial  incentives  to  farmers  for  adopting  environmentally  friendly 
agricultural  practices,  agri-environmental  schemes  are  currently  considered  as  the  most 
important policy to counteract the negative effects of modern agriculture on the environment, 
biodiversity  loss,  and  landscape  degradation.  Their  role  is  to  promote  the  so-called 
“multifunctionality”  of  agriculture:  agriculture  produces  jointly  commodity  and  non 
commodity outputs. Whereas the former – meat, grains, dairy products etc. – are marketable, 
the latter – biodiversity preservation, maintenance of traditional landscapes, etc. – exhibit the 
characteristics of externalities or public goods and are typically under produced. For example, 
an extensive ranching system will produce jointly milk and beef together with pasture and 
meadow biodiversity in an open landscape.  By providing farmers with incentive payments, 
public authorities try to encourage agricultural activities and technologies which produce as a 
joint-product more of these desirable environmental outputs. Agri-environmental measures 
extend beyond this first objective because the majority of them also promote technologies 
reducing the joint production of agricultural commodities and undesirable outputs such as 
pollution or resource degradation.  
 
The  underlying  rationale  of  agri-environmental  programs  is  that  it  is  cheaper  to  produce 
environmental goods jointly with agricultural activities than separately. It therefore assumes 
that jointness of two outputs A and B is a source of cost reduction or economies of scope
3.  
Cost (A) + Cost (B) > Cost (A∪B). 
Such cost sub-additivity (also called positive synergy) can be associated to different sources 
of  interactions  referred  to  in  the  literature  on  multi-output  production  as  (i)  technical  or 
biological  complementarities  in  production  process  which  induces  a  reduction  of  the  
marginal cost of producing A when the production of B increases (for example the joint 
production  of  honey  and  fruit  or  the  positive  effect  of  farming  rotations  to  plant  health 
protection)  (ii)  non  allocable  input  or  a  quasi-public  inputs  where  multiple  outputs  are 
                                                 
3 In fact, the literature on the jointness in multifunctional agriculture emphasises that a production possibility 
frontier (with agricultural output on one axis and environmental output on the other) most often displays an 
increasing segment expressing the complementarity between agriculture and environment, and a decreasing one 
capturing the competition between them (Havlik et al, 2006.)    5 
obtained from the same input (for example wool and sheep meat or the same agricultural 
mechanical materiel is used for various utilisation (iii) allocable inputs which are fixed in the 
short time which an increase in the production of one output change the amount of the factor 
available for the supply of the other (for example the allocation of land use or the labour) (iv) 
uncertainty  situation  at  the  demand  and  supply  side  of  production:  which  induces  to  the 
intertemporal management of productive risks and justifies the multiple output character of 
production. 
 
Although  the  literature  focuses  mostly  on  the  jointness  between  agricultural  and 
environmental outputs (Bonnieux et al, 2000; OECD 2001, Peelings and Polman, 2004),  the 
case  of  jointness  between  non-commodity  outputs  (i.e.  reduction  of  soil  pollution  AND 
promotion of insect biodiversity) is also very important to consider when designing agri-
environmental programs (Havlik and al, 2006).  
When an agri-environmental contract is signed between a French farmer and the French state, 
several environmental objectives are sought. However, the average cost of each contracted 
measure  is  evaluated  independently  of  the  whole  package,  regardless  of  existing  cost 
synergies  across  measures.  The  farmer  may  therefore  receive  a  payment  –the  sum  of 
individual  premia  associated  with  each  measure  -    which  can  exceed  by  far  the  true 
opportunity cost of the whole package in the case of positive synergy.  
There  are  various  sources  of  complementarities between  two  non  agricultural  outputs.  (i) 
They can be due to physical or biological interdependencies. For example, by contracting on 
mechanical weeding to reduce herbicide use, soil texture and therefore soil  moisture are 
improved and the opportunity cost of reducing irrigation is lower. A contract on rotational 
cropping and cover crop to limit soil  erosion will also enrich the  soil with nutrients  and 
organic matter therefore reducing the yield loss associated with a contract on lower use of 
chemical  fertilizers.  (ii)  Complementarities  can  also  be  due  to  non  allocable  inputs: 
contracting an agri-environmental measure on the management of hay meadows imposes the 
purchase of specific machinery which can also be used when contracting on the maintenance 
of hedgerows. (iii) Last but not least, positive cost synergies are often observed due to the 
specificities  of  agri-environmental  measures  which  are  often  action-based  rather  than 
outcome-based.  In  other  words  compliance  is  measured  on  the  basis  of  the  “action”  (ie: 
change  of  technology,  of  practice,  of  varieties  grown)  rather  than  on  the  basis  of  the 
environmental outcome obtained. Actions stated in some agri-environmental measures are 
often very similar to actions required  by other measures.   In the French context, farmers in 
mountainous  areas  are  allowed  to  contract  simultaneously    for  biodiversity  protection 
measures and for the agri-environmental grass premium (PHAE), although actions undertaken 
in both cases are almost identical.  Contracting separately the two contracts on different pieces 
of land may lead to less environmental gain and to a larger total cost than the sum of  the two 
contracts on the same land. 
No studies have examined how to adapt the contract allocation mechanism in order to take 
account of potential positive synergies due to jointness. This is the purpose of the following 
section 
 
2.  Multi-unit auctions of heterogeneous units 
 
Multiple bids in multi-unit auctions are auctions in which the auctioneer wishes to sell or buy 
several units of the same good and bidders are allowed to submit bids in the form of demand 
schedules or, for procurement auctions, supply schedules. The FCC spectrum auctions have 
revived theoretical and empirical research on such auctions. It is now widely acknowledged 
that results from single-object auctions do not generally extend to the multi-unit objects case   6 
(Binmore  and  Swierzbinski  2000).  It  is  also  clear  that  most  multi-unit  auctions  generate 
multiple equilibria, rendering intractable analytical solutions for optimum bidding.   In spite 
of the difficulties, a number of structural properties of bidding strategies have been predicted 
and  verified  through  experimental  work.  Noussair  (1995),  and  Engelbrecht-Wiggans  and 
Kahn (1998a) have shown that in a uniform-price auction, bidders tend to be sincere on the 
first unit (their bid is close to their true valuation) and then to underbid increasingly on the 
subsequent units. This is called demand reduction and is explained by the fact that   this 
strategy helps driving down the price of the last winning unit and therefore the price of all 
units won. On the other hand, Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998b) and Krishna (2002) 
show  that there is an incentive, in a pay-as-bid format, to submit flat bidding schedules, under 
the true demand curve. All these results concern auctions of identical units. 
 
One  branch  of  the  multi-unit  auction  literature,  focuses  on  the  case  when  units  are 
heterogenous  (Cramton  1997,  Milgrom  2000).  It  may  happen  then  that  bidders  have 
preferences over specific bundles of units. The most well-known example is the auctioning 
off  of  landing  and  take-off  slots  in  airports  (Rassenti,  Smith  and  Bulfin,  1982).  An  air 
company is only interested in winning a specific landing slot provided it can be sure to win 
the  corresponding  flight-compatible  take-off  slot.  Winning  one  of  the  two  slots  only  is 
worthless. Another example is synergies in costs or complementarities in demand. In such 
cases, allocating units simultaneously or sequentially might lead to losses for bidders because 
they face the risk to win an undesired combination of units and to pay a price higher than their 
valuations. This is called the exposure problem (Bykowsky et al, 2000) The combinatorial 
auction, by allowing bidders to bid on all desired bundles of units, eliminates this risk.   
 
A simple example can help understand the exposure risk: assume that the auctioneer wishes to 
buy  two  items  A  and  B,  in  a  sealed-bid  pay-your-bid  procurement  auction  with  several 
competing  bidders.  All  bidders  can  produce  A  and  B,  for  different  production  costs. 
Production costs are private information and are independent of the other bidders’ behaviours 
in  the  auction.  Assume  that  cost  functions  display  positive  synergies  (or  sub-additivity 
properties): for each bidder, the cost of producing A and B simultaneously is lower than the 
costs of producing A and B separately.  
For all i, Ci(A) + Ci(B) > Ci(A∪B)  with Ci (Z) production cost of item Z, Z=A, B or A∪B 
 
In a simultaneous auction, bidders can only make bids on A and B separately. They run the 
risk to win A without B or vice versa, therefore foregoing the benefits of cost sub-additivity. 
The risk of loss is even greater if they have adopted an underbidding strategy in order to 
increase their chance of winning the two units. For example assume that the production cost C 
of bidder i is 20 for unit A, 10 for unit B and 24 if both units are produced together.   
C(A) + C(B) > C(A∪B) 
Bidder i might decide to bid a price P(A) = 16 on unit A and P(B) = 9 on unit B. If he wins A 
and B, he will gain P(A)+P(B)- C(A∪B);= 1 . However it is a risky strategy since he may 
well win only unit A (unit B being awarded to a bidder with a lower bid for B) and therefore 
incur a loss P(A)-C(A) = -4. 
 
The sequential auction partially reduces the exposure risk since bidders make their bid on unit 
B, knowing the results of the contest for unit A. However, it does not eliminate exposure risk. 
The same bidder i may take the risk to underbid on unit A in order to maximise his chances  
of winning it , in the hope of winning also unit B and benefit of the synergy effect.   
Assuming again that he bids P(A)=16 on unit A and wins it. He then enters the second auction 
without uncertainties about the allocation of A. But he may bid P(B) = 9 on unit B and loose,   7 
therefore suffering the same loss as in the simultaneous auction. On the other hand, if he has 
not won A, then he is typically in a situation of a single unit auction. The optimal bidding 
strategy (Vickrey 1961) is one of overbidding (P(B)>C(B) and overbidding is declining when 
the number of bidders increases. 
 
With combinatorial auctions, bidders are allowed to submit bids on packages of units. It 
reduces the uncertainty that comes with multiple bids and eliminates the exposure problem. 
 Bidder i can now make three separate bids: one on A, one on B, and one on the package 
A∪B.  For  example,  he  can  bid  P(A)=22,  P(B)  =  11  and  P(A∪B)  =  28.  Provided  the 
auctioneer is not allowed to select separate bids for A and B from the same bidder
4, it can be 
expected that the combinatorial auction improves the auction performance both in terms of 
budget expenses for the auctioneer and in terms of social efficiency (that is buying units A 
and B from the lowest-cost providers).  However, it is worth mentioning that another strategic 
incentive can crop up since a bidder’s bid on one bundle can compete with his own bids on 
other bundles.  The benefit to bidder i from lowering his bid on unit A is that it increases his 
chance of winning A. But it lowers his net gains on unit A and it reduces his chance of 
winning the package A∪B.  
 
The consequence of this strategic behaviour is that there are examples when the combinatorial 
auction leads to lower efficiency and greater expenses than the corresponding simultaneous or 
sequential auctions (Cantillon and Pesendorfer 2004). In fact there is no general theoretical 
result on whether a combinatorial first price auction performs better than simultaneous or 
sequential auctions, although partial analytical results are available (see Bikhchandani,1999; 
Chakraborty, 2004).  
 
The lack of theoretical guidance as to general predictions concerning revenue and efficiency 
of multi-unit auction mechanisms in presence of synergies has called attention to the results 
obtained  from  laboratory  experiments.  In  an  experiment  involving  a  human  subject 
demanding  two  units  bidding  against  computer  rivals,  Kagel  and  Levin  (2005)  have 
investigated the tension between demand reduction and positive synergies, comparing sealed-
bid and ascending-bid uniform-price auctions. They show that for low valuations, demand 
reduction  behaviour  dominates,  therefore  inducing  underbidding  strategies.  For  higher 
valuation, the synergy force dominates, inducing bidders to increase their bids in order to 
increase the chance of winning the package. It is more indeterminate at middle valuations. 
 
Leydyard, Porter and Rangel (1997) conduct test-bed experiments to respond to the following 
two questions in the case of heterogeneous items with synergies: Should items be auctioned 
off  sequentially  or  simultaneously?  Should  package  bidding  be  allowed?  Their  main 
conclusion is that, over a wide range of environments, package bidding mechanisms dominate 
simultaneous mechanisms which in turn dominate sequential mechanisms. They show that in 
environments  with  heterogeneous  goods  exhibiting  complementarities,  sequential  auctions 
perform poorly. The simultaneous auction tends to produce outcomes that are either  high in 
efficiency,  revenue  and  losses  or  low  in  efficiency,  revenue  and  losses.  Package  bidding 
seems to help in systematically attaining high efficiency, high revenue and no losses. 
  
Our experiment is partially based on the work of Lunander and Nilsson (2004) who have 
compared the bidding behaviour for multiple contracts in the simultaneous, sequential and 
                                                 
4 Alternatively, the bidder is compelled to place on a bundle a bid which is superior to the sum of the bids on 
individual units making the bundle (Cantillon and Pesendorfer 2003).    8 
combinatorial formats. Their experiments show that efficiency is enhanced  and procurement 
costs reduced by allowing combination bids. 
 
Our analysis therefore attempts to complement his study on a simpler setting with a more 
careful analysis of data results.  We do not address the issue of the equilibrium strategy for the 
sequential, simultaneous and combinatorial auction. Our research questions is to investigate 
the relative performance of the three different multi-unit auction format in the presence of 
positive cost synergies:  
(i)  To  compare  the  budgetary  efficiency  and  the  allocative  efficiency  of  sequential, 
simultaneous and combinatorial fist price sealed-bid auctions, for different degrees of positive 
synergy 
(ii) To analyse the structural properties of bidding strategies under these three formats, in 
order to explain the differences in performance 
(iii)  To  measure  the  impact  on  performance  of  information  feedback  (on  winning  bids) 
provided to bidders, in a context of repeated auctions.  
 
Based on the literature review, we make the following hypothesis: 
We first check that results provided by Leydyard, Porter and Rangel (1997) and Lunander and 
Nilsson (2004) are also valid in our experimental setting:  
(i) Allocative efficiency is on average greater when combinatorial bidding is allowed than 
under the sequential and the simultaneous mechanisms.  
(ii) Simultaneous and sequential auctions may lead to losses for auction winners to due the 
exposure issue. As a consequence, budgetary efficiency (from the auctioneer viewpoint) can 
be greater for simultaneous and for sequential auctions than for combinatorial auctions. This 
result should not hold if we only had risk averse bidders. 
(iii) The preceding two results are more clear-cut when cost-synergy is greater 
(iv) We also check the findings of Cox, Smith and Walker (1984) on information: as a side 
result  of  their  pioneering  experiments  on  bidding  behaviour  in  multi-unit  auctions,  they 
mention that the feedback on winning bids in previous rounds has no significant impact on 
bidding  strategies.  Their  justification  is  that  it  does  not  provide  enough  information  to 
improve strategies.  
 
The paper also provides a first analysis and comparison of bidding behaviour under the three 
bidding mechanisms. 
 




Each  experimental  session
5  (table  1)  consisted  of  a  series  of  auction  periods  where  four 
subjects competed to sell two non identical projects A and B to the experimenter. Six non 
computerized  sessions  were  conducted  in  2006  with  14  periods  each.  In  addition,  two   
computerized  sessions  were  conducted  in  2007  with  34  periods  each.  The  computerized 
experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 1999). 
Instructions and protocols were kept strictly identical to the non computerized sessions. The 
advantage of computerized experiments is mainly time gain, allowing to conduct a greater 
number of periods in the same time span (2 hours for a session).  
                                                 
5 Experimental sessions were conducted with students from the University of Montpellier and from Montpellier- 
SupAgro. More sessions are planned in September to investigate negative synergy and to complete results. 
   9 
 
The experiments were run under two different levels of synergies (i) low synergy and (ii) high 
synergy. Production costs for subject i and period t of project A  ( ) , i t C A   and of project B 
( ) , i t C B  varied across subjects and across periods but displayed the same level of synergy: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , , , 0.7* i t i t i t C A B C A C B   = +  for high synergy 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , , , 0.9* i t i t i t C A B C A C B   = +  for low synergy 
 
Private costs of A and B  were randomly drawn for each subject in each auction period from a 
uniform distribution on the interval ]0, 100]. At the beginning of a session, subjects were told 
that their costs for A and B were drawn from such a distribution. They also knew that they 
competed  with  three  other  subjects,  also  willing  to  sell  two  projects  but  they  could  not 
identify them. Each subject was given privately his costs for A, B and A∪B at the beginning 
of each period, and was then invited to bid.  
 
All purchases were conducted with sealed bid pay-your-bid auctions. We have conducted 
three sessions using the simultaneous format, three sessions using the sequential format, and 
two sessions using a combinatorial auction.  
-  In the simultaneous auction, subjects were allowed to make two separate bids, one for 
project A and one for project B. The experimenter (or the computer) ranked the bids 
for A and for B and selected the lowest bid for project A and the lowest bid for project 
B. Subjects were privately informed whether they had won project A or project B or 
both . They were invited to calculate their gains. Then another period started with new 
costs being announced. 
-  In  the  sequential  auction,  subjects  were  first  invited  to  bid  on  project  A.  The 
experimenter ranked the bids, selected the lowest bid and informed the winner.  Then 
bidders were invited to bid on project B. The experimenter ranked the bids on project 
B, selected the lowest bid and informed the winner. 
-  In the combinatorial auction, subjects were invited to submit three bids, on A, on B 
and on A∪B. The experimenter (or computer) calculated the 12 sums of bids on A and 
bids on B (excluding thus the sum of bids on A and B submitted by the same bidder) 
and selected the lowest. This bid combination is compared to the lowest bid on A∪B. 
The lowest of the two indicates the winner(s), who is (are) then informed.  
 
In the first 7 (for non computerized sessions) or 17 periods (for computerized sessions), the 
winning bid was only communicated to the winner. In the last 7 or 17 periods, the value of the 
winning bid was made public  but the identity of the winner was not revealed (except for the 
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Table 1: Experimental design 
 
Number of sessions  8  Two combinatorial sessions 
Three sequential sessions 
Three simultaneous sessions 
Number of auction 
periods per session 
14 or 34  In  the  first  7  or  17  periods,  winning  bids  are  not  public 
information 
In the last 7 or 17 periods, winning bids are public information 
Number of groups per 
session 
2 or 4  Groups with low cost synergy  (0.9) 





Subjects  bid  simultaneously  on  project  A,  project  B  and 
project (A∪B).  
The sequential auction  First price sealed-
bid 
Subjects  bid  first  on  project  A,  then  auction  results  are 
provided. Subjects then bid on project B, and auction results 






Subjects bid simultaneously on project A and project B.  There 
is no bid on the project (A∪B) 
 
Winners calculated their gains as follows: if  a bidder won either of the two projects, then his 
profit  was  equal  to  the  difference  between  his  winning  bid  and  his  cost  for  the  winning 
project: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) A M A C A   =    for project A 
( ) ( ) ( ) B M B C B   =    for project B 
However, if he won the two projects, then his profit was equal to the difference  between the 
sum of his winning bids on the two projects (for a simultaneous or a sequential auction) or his 
winning bid on the project A∪B (in the combinatorial auction) and the cost of project A∪B:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) A B M A M B C A B     = +      for  the simultaneous or the sequential auction  
( ) ( ) ( ) A B M A B C A B     =        for  the combinatorial auction  
Gains were cumulated from one period to another. Total gains were paid at the end of each 
session, using an exchange rate of 10% (10 yens =1€). The average total gains is equal to 15 € 
per subjects to which was added a 10 euro show-up fee, for a two hour session.  
 
Experimental results on auction performance 
 
Analysing auction performance is a multi-dimensional task. In our paper we choose to analyse 
the allocation efficiency (AE) and the budgetary efficiency (BE).  
Allocative efficiency is attained when projects are allocated to the lowest-cost producer(s), 
indicating thus that projects are produced at the lowest social cost. We calculate indicator AE 
as  the  ratio  of  the  lowest  attainable  production  cost  to  obtain  projects  A  and  B,  to  the 
production costs of selected producers of projects A and B. If AE =1, allocative efficiency is 
maximized. The lower AE, the lower the allocative efficiency of the auction.  
Budgetary efficiency is attained when the price paid by the auctioneer for a project(s) does not 
exceed the true production cost of the project(s). We calculate indicator BE as the ratio of the 
winning  projects’  costs  to  the  winning  projects’  bids.  If  BE  =  1,  the  price  paid  exactly 
compensates the costs: there is no information rent for the bidder. If  BE <1, it indicates that 
the auctioneer is overpaying the project. The lower BE, the lower budget efficiency. It may   11 
happen that BE >1 : the auctioneer pays less for the project than their true cost of production, 
and winners suffer a loss. This is the exposure problem already mentioned in the previous 
section.  










LPAC  is the project A’s lowest cost 
LPBC  is the project B’ lowest cost 
LPABC  is the project A∪B’s lowest cost 
WPC  is the cost of winning project(s)  
WBP  is the tbid (or sum of bids) of winning project(s) 
 
We are also concerned about whether or not there is a trade off between the two criteria, 
because it will have consequences for decision-makers when designing an agri-environmental 
auction (Miller and al, 2004). To ensure that its method for attaining environmental benefits 
meets other policy objectives or political constraints, policy makers may choose to sacrifice 
economic efficiency for reduced budget costs. In the current European context, where support 
for rural development for the 2007-2013 programmation period has planned a reduction of the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, governments may be tempted  to adopt 
budgetary efficiency as a dominant criterion when auction design is determined. The loss in 
allocation efficiency may be small compared to the gain in budgetary efficiency. 
 
Table 2 calculates average AE and BE scores  -and their standard deviations- obtained in the 
three auctions mechanisms, for the two levels of synergy. It also indicates the number of 
periods when full allocative efficiency or full budgetary efficiency (including when BE>1) is 
observed.  We  test  if  this  performance  indicators  differ  significantly  across  auction  
mechanisms and across synergy levels using a 5% Wilcoxon rank-sum unmatched data test
6. 
 
Table 2: Performance criteria results across synergy and mechanisms 
 
  High level  Low level 
Auction mechanism  Simu  Seq  Combi  Simu  Seq  Combi 
Average AE  0.69  0.68  0.98  0.93  0.92  0.96 
Average BE   0.94  0.99  0.89  0.88  1  0.92 
Std dev AE  0.04  0.06  0.04  0.05  0.07  0.06 
Std dev BE  0.19  0.21  0.1  0.07  0.41  0.07 
Number of auctions for which AE=1  0  0  21  24  21  20 
Number of auctions for which BE ≥1  26  48  1  4  27  4 
Number of auctions  96  96  28  90  90  28 
 
According to table 2, the combinatorial auction generated fully efficient allocations for both 
synergy levels in 70% of the experiments, compared to respectively 0% in the high synergy 
                                                 
6 We don’t use Student test because sample size are unequals, some of observations don’t verify the normal 
distribution and finally after using some equality variance tests, in most of the cases we reject the hypothesis that 
variances are equal. 
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scenario and less than 30% in the low synergy scenario for the sequential and simultaneous 
auctions. Moreover, the average AE for combinatorial auction is close to one and greater than 
average  AE  obtained  by  simultaneous  or  sequential  auctions.  The  results  from  Wilcoxon 
unmatched data test in table 3 confirm that the combinatorial auction leads to more efficient 
allocation than the sequential and simultaneous auctions for both synergy levels. Table 3 also 
show that the greater the level of  synergy, the greater the allocation efficiency advantage of 
the combinatorial auction over the two other mechanisms. 
 
Proposition  1:  Allocation  efficiency  is  enhanced  by  allowing  combinatorial  bidding  as 
compared to sequential or simultaneous bidding 
 
Average  figures  for  budget  efficiency  in  table  2  show  a  different  picture. The  sequential 
auction  displays  the  highest  average  BE,  followed  by  the  simultaneous  auction.  This  is 
entirely due to exposure: by taking the risk to bid below cost in order to increase their chance 
to win a bundle (i.e. in the sequential auction, 20% and 17% of bids on project A and project 
B respectively were below-cost bids), bidders often end up winning an item and making a 
loss. It is equivalent to the well-known winner’s curse of common value auctions. This is a 
short-term  benefit  for  the  auctioneer  but  it  has  to  be  underlined  that  in  a  real  agri-
environmental  auction,  such  outcome  would  not  be  welcome  since  it  is  likely  to  lead  to 
unsatisfaction with the auctioning procedure, increasing distrust from farmers, and a drop-off 
of participation rate in subsequent auctions. The Wilcoxon unmatched data test in table 3 
demonstrates  that  the  sequential  auction  does  lead  to  higher  budget  efficiency  than  the 
simultaneous auction and that the combinatorial auction does not display greater budgetary 
efficiency than the two other mechanisms.  
 
Proposition  2:  the  sequential  auction  leads  to  greater  budgetary  efficiency  than  the 
simultaneous auction for both levels of synergy 
Proposition 3: the combinatorial auction does not display greater budgetary efficiency than 
the simultaneous auction.  
 
 
Comparing  performance  across  synergy  levels,  we  find  that  allocation  efficiency  of  the 
combinatorial auction is relatively insensitive to synergy levels. On the other hand, allocative 
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Table 3: Wilcoxon unmatched data test for performance criteria 
 
    AE z-statistics  BE z-statistics  Observations 
LS       
Seq - Sim  -0.8  3.82**  180 
Sim - Combi  -3.44**  -1.66  118 
Seq - Combi  -3.82**  1.3  118 
HS       
Seq - Sim  -0.78  2.92**  192 
Sim - Combi  -8.04**  2.11*  124 
Across 
mechanism 
Seq - Combi  -8.04**  3.53**  124 
HS Sim - LS Sim  -11.75**  3.09**  186 
HS Combi - LS Combi  0.43  -0.85  56 
 
Across 
synergy  HS Seq - LS Seq  -11.24**  2.25*  186 
 
** significantly different at 99% confidence level 
* significantly different at 95% confidence level 
LS: low synergy      HS high synergy 
Seq: sequential auction    Sim: simultaneous auction  Combi: combinatorial auction 
 
From the budget efficiency viewpoint, results are less clear. The budgetary efficiency does not 
vary significantly with the level of synergy in the case of the combinatorial auction. For 
simultaneous  and  sequential  auctions,  budgetary  efficiency  is  greater  for  high  levels  of 
synergy.  
 
Proposition 4: The performance (AE and BE) of the combinatorial auction is independent of 
the level of synergy.  
Proposition 5: Simultaneous and sequential auction display greater allocative efficiency and 
lower budgetary efficiency when synergy levels are low. 
 
Tables 4 and 5 compare performance criteria in the presence or not of feedback information 
on winning bids. Although slight differences can be detected, the Wilcoxon matched data test 
demonstrates  that  the  information  feedback  does  not  have  any  significant  effect  on  the 
average allocation ad budgetary efficiency for the three auctions formats. The only exception 
is  for the combinatorial auction under high synergy, which displays a slightly higher budget 
efficiency  when  winning  bids  are  made  public  than  when  winning  bids  remain  private 
information. However, the test is only valid at 95% confidence level. More data are required 
to confirm or not this last result.    
 
Proposition 5: Information feedback in the form of making available to all bidders the value 
of winning bids in previous auctions, does not significantly affect performance of the three 
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Table 4: Performance criteria across information for high synergy 
 
  High synergy 
  Without information feedback  With information feedback 
Auction format  Simu  Seq  Combi  Simu  Seq  Combi 
Average AE  0.69  0.68  0.98  0.68  0.67  0.97 
Average BE  0.92  1.01  0.85  0.96  0.98  0.93 
Std dev AE  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.05  0.07  0.05 
Std dev BE  0.16  0.2  0.11  0.22  0.22  0.07 
Number of auctions 
for which AE=1 
0  0  10  0  0  11 
Number of auctions 
for which BE ≥1 
13  25  0  13  23  1 
Observations  48  48  14  48  48  14 
  Low synergy 
Auction format  Simu  Seq  Combi  Simu  Seq  Combi 
Average AE  0.92  0.91  0.94  0.93  0.92  0.98 
Average BE  0.88  1.05  0.92  0.88  0.96  0.91 
Std dev AE  0.05  0.06  0.08  0.05  0.07  0.03 
Std dev BE  0.08  0.59  0.05  0.07  0.14  0.08 
Number of auctions 
for which AE=1 
9  8  8  15  13  12 
Number of auctions 
for which BE ≥1 
4  14  1  0  14  3 
Observations  42  42  14  48  48  14 
 
 
Table 5: Wilcoxon matched data test for performance criteria 
 
Across information  EA z-statistics  EB z-statistics  Observations 
LS       
Sim Without - Sim With  -0.29  0.01  42 
Seq Without - Seq With  -0.53  0.21  42 
Combi Without - Combi With  -1.96*  0.53  14 
 
HS       
Sim Without - Sim With  0.64  -0.37  48 
Seq Without - Seq With  -0.08  0.44  48 
Combi Without - Combi With  -0.23  -2.29*  14 
 
** significantly different at 99% confidence level 
* significantly different at 95% confidence level 
LS: low synergy      HS high synergy 
Seq: sequential auction    Sim: simultaneous auction  Combi: combinatorial auction 
 
Conclusion: from these preliminary results, we show that allocative efficiency is enhanced by 
allowing combinatorial bidding when compliance costs are subadditive, which is coherent 
with Lunander and Nilsson (2004). However, these results are obtained in a given set-up 
(bidders do not communicate, they know the distribution from which compliance costs are 
drawn, as well as the number of bidders and the number of rounds). Then generalisation from 
our results to the agri-environmental context should be drawn with these facts in mind. 
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Experimental results on bid patterns 
  
From  the  analysis  of  bid  results,  we  try  to  explain  the  bidding  behavior  and  their  main 
differences between the three auction mechanisms. We used panael data analysis. Tests show 
that the fixed effect model is the most robust. 
 
We therefore estimated three fixed effect  regression: 
 
•  1 2 3 4 it it it it it MA a a CA a CASYN a CAINFO   = + + + +  
where  it MA  and  it CA  are respectively the bid and private cost for project A of subject i in 
auction period t,  it CASYN  and  it CAINFO  are slope dummy variables which are equal to  it CA  
when synergy level is low and when there is information feedback, zero otherwise.  it    is an 
error term with the usual properties. 
 
•  1 2 3 4 5 it it it it it it MB b b CB b CBSYN a CBINFO b CBGA   = + + + + +  
where  it MB  and  it CB  are respectively the bid and private cost for project B of subject i in 
auction period  t,  it CBSYN  and  it CBINFO  are slope dummy  variables which are equal to 
it CB  when synergy level is low and when there is information feedback, zero otherwise. 
it CBGA  is a slope dummy variable used only for the sequential auction regression. It is equal 
to  it CB  if the bidder has won the project A, zero otherwise.  it    is an error term with the usual 
properties. 
 
•  1 2 3 4 5 it it it it it it MAB c c CAB c CABSYN c CABINFO c CABGA   = + + + + +  
where  it MAB  and  it CAB  are the bid and private value for the project (A∪B) of subject  i in 
auction  period  t.  However,  there  is  no  bid  for  (A∪B)  project  in  the  sequential  and 
simultaneous  auctions.  To  be  able  to  compare  between  auctions  mechanisms,  we  have 
calculated  it it it MAB MA MB = +  and  it it it CAB CA CB = +  for the sequential and simultaneous 
auctions.  it CABSYN  and  it CABINFO  are slope dummy  variables which are equal to  it CAB  
when synergy level is low and when there is information feedback, zero otherwise.  it CABGA  
is a slope dummy variable used only for the sequential auction regression. It is equal to  it CAB  
if  the  bidder  has  won  the  project  A,  zero  otherwise.  it     is  an  error  term  with  the  usual 
properties. 
 
In estimating these equations for each auction mechanism, our primary concern was with the 
sign and statistical significance of the slope coefficients. We also examined if bids line up 
with costs or not, by testing the equality to one of the estimated cost coefficients.  
In  the  regressions,  1 1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ , , a b c   indicate  the  fixed  mark-up  between  bids  and  costs  whereas 
2 2 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ , , a b c  indicate the impact of project A’s cost, project B’s cost and project AB’s cost on bid 
values.   3 3 3 ˆ ˆ ˆ , , a b c  provide a measure of the synergy’s impact on each bidding behaviour and 
4 4 4 ˆ ˆ ˆ , , a b c  provide a measure of the impact of feedback information on each bid function.  5 5 ˆ ˆ , b c  
indicate whether winning the fist unit has an impact on the bid strategy on the second project 
B in the sequential auction   16 
 
Table 6 reports the results of fixed effect regression models for the project A. The slope 
coefficient  2 ˆ a   is  significantly  different  from  zero  for  the  three  auctions  mechanisms  and 
indicates  that  the  greater  the  project  A’s  costs,  the  greater  the  bid.  Furthermore,  it  is 
significantly greater than one in the combinatorial auction and less than one in the sequential 
and simultaneous auctions. The intercept is also significantly greater than zero indicating a 




The  statistical  significance  of  CASYN  slope  dummy  coefficient  is  only  observed  for  the 
sequential and simultaneous auctions but with a different sign. In the simultaneous  auction a 
negative 3 ˆ a  indicates that subjects bid less when synergy is lower. However, in the case of 
sequential auction, a lower synergy increases the bid. 
 
Finally  coefficient  values  for  4 ˆ a   are  significant  and  negative  for  the  simultaneous  and 
combinatorial auctions, indicating that under feedback information, subjects decrease their 
bids.  
 
Table 6: Auction outcomes for project A 
 











































2  94%  93%  92% 
 
Observations  768  768  224 
 
** significantly different at 99% confidence level 
* significantly different at 95% confidence level 
 
Table 7 provides regression results for bidding strategies on project B. For the three auction 
mechanisms, the slope coefficient  2 ˆ b  is significantly different from zero indicating that bids 
on B increase in project B’s costs. The intercept remains high indicating an average fixed 
mark-up between bids and costs of more than 6.  
                                                 
7 We have also tested for a different model in which we estimated the difference between bids and costs as a 
function of costs. However, this model did not provide statistical good results, indicating that the overbidding or 
underbidding strategies are not dependent on costs. This contradicts what is known for multi-unit auction 
optimal bidding and is currently being investigated further with more sophisticated econometric models.   
8 Significantly different from 0 at the 1% level   17 
The CBSYN dummy variable is only significatively different from zero in the simultaneous 
auction, indicating that subjects bid less when synergy is lower. The impact of information 
feedback is only significant for the simultaneous and combinatorial auctions and leads to a bid 
reduction. Finally, the coefficient  4 ˆ b  indicates that bidders who have won the project A in the 
first auction of the sequential mechanism tend to reduce their bid on  B to increase their 
chance of winning the bundle.  
 
Table 7: Auction outcomes for project B 
 























































Observations  768  768  224 
 
** significantly different at 99% confidence level 
* significantly different at 95% confidence level 
 
The fixed effect regression model results for bids on project  (A∪B) is reported in Table 8.  
We do not claim to examine this regression for the sequential and simultaneous auctions 
given  that  bidding  for  the  project  (A∪B)  is  not  allowed.  However,  we  just  use  them  to 
compare with the combinatorial auction.  The slope coefficient  2 ˆ c  is strictly positive and close 
to 1. Moreover, the intercept  1 ˆ c  is significatively lower for the combinatorial auction than for 
the simultaneous or the sequential auction. We note also that neither synergy nor information 
have  a  significant  impact  on  the  project  (A∪B)  bid  for  the  combinatorial  auction. 










   18 





















** significantly different at 99% confidence level 
* significantly different at 95% confidence level 
 
4.  Conclusion  
 
The  purpose  of  this  work  was  (i)  to  compare  the  performance  of  different  procurement 
auction designs in the case of multiple heterogeneous units which display positive synergy. 
The  comparison  was  made  by  using  two  performance  criteria:  budget  efficiency  and 
allocative  efficiency.    We  also  testes  if  performance  results    are  affected  by  information 
feedback to bidders   after each auction period. (ii) to explain performance results by the 
analyses  of  bidding  behaviour  in  the  three  mechanisms.  Given  insufficient  theoretical 
guidance from the literature, this was done by means of controlled laboratory experiments. 
Some  clear  conclusions  emerge  from  this  study.  The  first  is  that  allowing  combinatorial 
bidding enhances the allocation efficiency compared to sequential and simultaneous bidding. 
This result is close to the Ledyard et al’s  conclusion (1997). However the sequential auction 
leads to greater budget efficiency than the simultaneous auction for both levels of synergy. 
This is due to excessive risk exposure and is obtained at the expenses of bidders making 
losses.  The  second  conclusion  is  that  information  feedback  seems  to  have  not  effect  on 
performance in any of the three auction mechanisms.  
The third conclusion reports that in a simultaneous auction, subjects reduce their overbidding 
strategy when synergy is lower, while in the sequential auction they bid more on the first 
project and  less on the second.  Because of  positive synergy effects, when a bidder wins the 
first project, he reduces in consequence his bid on the second project in order to increase his 
chance to win the bundle. Unlike these two auction mechanisms, the combinatorial bidding is 
insensitive to the level of positive synergy. The last conclusion indicates a less intuitive result. 
Even though information feedback does not affect performance criteria in the simultaneous 
and sequential auctions, the bidding behaviour models show that subjects decrease their bids, 
                                                 
9 For sequential and simultaneous auctions we sum MA&MB , in order to compare with the combinatorial 
auction’s MAB 

















































2  91%  92%  81% 
 
Observations  768  768  224   19 
in the presence of information feedback, on the two projects for the simultaneous auction and 
on the first project for the sequential auction.  
The  underlying  rationale  of  using  heterogeneous  multi-unit  auctions  is    the  presence  of 
potential positive synergy between agri-environmental measures. A special feature of agri-
environmental  multi-unit  auctions  are  that  several  measures  can  be  auctioned  off 
simultaneously allowing submitting for combinatorial bids in addition to stand-alone bid or 
allowing sequential bid. However, the feasibility of combinatorial auction is more complex 
than the experimental auction. Actually more than two measures can be auctioned off for 
more than four farmers leading to a huge set of propositions. The number of propositions 
increase exponentially in the number of proposed measures and in the number of participating 
farmers.  This  is  called  the  winner  determination  problem,  whose  resolution  requires  a 
complex  computing  and  algorithmic  consideration.  Because  of  the  exposure  problem,  the 
feasibility of sequential auction can induce farmers to losses and reduces their participations 
leading to insufficient environmental services. 
 
This work was framed in the context of agri-environmental auctions but they are of interest in 
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